Shutting down

I’ve seen a number of situations recently where entrepreneurs decided to shut their startups down while they still had cash in the bank. (Contrary to popular mythology, I’ve never seen a case where investors forced an early-stage startup to shut down before they ran out of cash — it has always been voluntary).  Shutting down is an incredibly hard thing to do.  It takes great maturity and intellectual honesty to realize things aren’t going the way you hoped and that it might be better to just close shop and do something else.

How entrepreneurs handle shutting down is very important.  First, try to return as much capital to your investors as you can (after paying off employees and other important debts – but don’t waste money on an expensive legal process). Second, if you’ve developed IP, spend a few months trying to sell it to recover as much capital as you can (often investors will offer a “carve out” to incentivize entrepreneurs since the likely return to investors will be under total number of preferences).  Don’t go off starting a new venture before you’ve properly closed down your current one (I’ve seen this twice recently – very bad form).  Finally, for your own learning as well as your reputation, write a detailed post-mortem about what went right and wrong and send it to your investors, and then try to follow up with in-person discussions.

Here’s the good news.  One of the great things about angel and venture investors is that failure is accepted, as long as you do it in the right way. Venture investors will often fund entrepreneurs who’ve lost their money in the past. They understand that if you build an interesting product and, say, market forces turn dramatically against you, that’s a risk they took — and the type of risk they will take a again. Also, entrepreneurs tend to be judged by their wins (max() function), not their average.  You’d be surprised how many entrepreneurs have failures in their past that no one remembers once they have some success.

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  • I am a new commenter and a bit green. I am struggling with some concepts. Can anyone tell me what this sentence means:

    (often investors will offer a “carve out” to incentivize entrepreneurs since the likely return to investors will be under total number of preferences).

    Sorry if it's a silly question. I post equally silly questions on other blogs and pundits seem to enjoy answering them in a big brotherly kind of way :)

    So hope it's the same case here.

    Rebecca.
  • It's not a silly question. I use a lot of jargon.

    say VC's invest $5M in your company and then you sell the assets of the company. the way it usually works is the VC's get the *greater* of the amount they invested ($5M, referred to as "preferences") or their % ownership. So if you sell it for, say, $3M the VCs would get it all, which provides no financial incentive for management to work on the sale. So a "carve out" is when VCs say they'll give management, say, 20% of the sale price despite the preferences.
  • My friend Mark Goldenson did a great job doing exactly this on his last swing, PlayCafe.com. And he not only did a post-mortem, but published it on VentureBeat: http://entrepreneur.venturebeat.com/2009/04/29/...

    It pays off. His new swing, Breakthrough.com is going gangbusters, and in no small part because his investors in PlayCafe are still sold on him as an entrepreneur, thanks to his maturity in how PlayCafe shut down.
  • I agree that how you handle "defeat" tells more about someone than how they handle winning. It defines what character is all about.
  • Great to see this addressed. Regarding important debts, employees always come first, for moral if not legal reasons. Other debts are always negotiable.

    I believe you're judged not just by your wins but also by your character during losses. Rough times certainly give you insights into the character of the people around you. Start-ups aren't just about impressing investors; they're also about finding the kind of people you want to work with in the future, and you really find out about someone when things get ugly.
  • Writing a detailed postmortem is really great advice. I didn't put one together at first but as I started to write about where we succeeded and failed two things happened for me. One, I began looking at things more positively because along the way we did do some really cool things and I learned an absolute ton. This was hard to see at first because the most recent memories are of the decline and ultimate failure. Second, what I initially thought about why things didn't work out wasn't fully baked. Of course I knew where we went wrong and what market conditions didn't go in our favor but after I spent dedicated time reviewing the past couple years I had a much clearer and more thorough understanding of everything. This has helped me grow as an entrepreneur and be better prepared for my next move.
  • davidkpark
    At a high level of abstraction, you are serving like a great advisor to so many startups. Many thanks.
  • That's really flattering. I hope my blog posts are helpful.
  • honam
    Good advice. Management has to lead, not investors. The VCs in my wife's company wanted to see a $100mm marketing plan during the bubble and wanted to invest more (she was the VP Marketing under the gun to come up with the plan). They performed marketing tests instead. Concluded it that it wasn't going to work. Management, not the investors, recommended that they shut down the company with $10mm still left in the bank before the crash - saved everyone from wasted time and money (she moved on to eBay and Paypal for the next 9 years and did fine).
  • Chris, this was one of the hardest things I have done. I raised a fairly large angel round with one early stage institutional investor and ended up returning 98 cents on the dollar when we found that the market we were going after was further locked up then we had hoped.

    We were open and transparent the whole time and managed expectations along the whole way. When we decided to close up shop, the investors were already aware about the market and we wrote a 12 page document about the market, industry as a whole, and future game-plan in which the investors LOVED. They said this was well worth the overall investment.

    It's hard, but check the ego @ the door.
  • check the ego @ the door ... is that a Mahan Khalsa quote?
  • Yep, if I were an investor in that company I'd like the entrepreneur more afterwards than before.
  • btw, long time listener, first time caller.

    big fan.
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