Chris Dixon

From far away, things that are very different look alike. I grew up in a family of musicians and English professors. To them, the entire financial industry seemed corrupt. When I worked in finance – first on Wall Street and then in venture capital – I saw that the reality was much more nuanced. Some finance is productive and useful and some is corrupt and parasitic.

Most financial markets start out with a productive purpose. Derivatives like futures and options started out as a way for companies to reduce risk in non-core areas, for example for airlines to hedge their exposure to oil prices and transnationals to hedge their exposure to currency fluctuations. The sellers of these derivatives were aggregators who pooled risk, much like insurance companies do. The overall effect was a net reduction in risk to our economy without hampering growth and returns.

Then speculators entered the market, creating more complicated derivative products and betting with borrowed money.  This was defended as a way to increase liquidity and efficiency. But it came at the cost of making the system more complicated and susceptible to abuse. Worst of all, these so-called innovations increased the overall risk to the system, something we saw quite vividly during the recent financial crisis.

Venture capital is a shining example of capitalism just like Adam Smith pictured it, where private vice really does lead to public virtue.  Consider, for example, two of the largest areas of venture investment: biotech and cleantech.  Here we see the best and brightest – top science graduates from places like MIT and Stanford – devoting their lives to curing cancer and developing new energy sources.  These students may be motivated by good will, but need not be, since they will also get rich if they succeed.

A strong case can be made that the financial industry needs significantly more regulation, particularly around big banks and derivatives markets. But it would be a tragic mistake to create regulations that hinder angel investing and venture capital.  From the outside, VC and Wall Street might appear similar, but the closer you get, the more you understand how different they really are.

It is common to hear entrepreneurs and investors talk about the high level of engagement (what we used to call “stickiness”) of their website.  They quite rightly believe that it’s better to have a more engaging user experience, as that generally means happy users. Unfortunately, the dominant advertising model on the web – Cost per Click (CPC) – rewards un-sticky websites.  As Randall Lucas said in response to one of my earlier posts:

The paradox, it seems is this: in a pay-per-click driven world, site visitors who want to stay on your site — due to it having the once-much-lauded quality of “stickiness” — are worth much less than those who want to flee your site because it’s clearly not valuable, and hence will click through to somewhere else.

Facebook recently became the most visited site on the web. Yet their revenues are rumored to around $1B – about 1/30 of what Google’s revenues will be this year. Google has the perfect revenue-generating combination:  people come to the site often, leave quickly, and often have purchasing intent. Facebook has tons of visitors but they generally come to socialize, not to buy things, and they rarely click on ads that take them to other sites. Facebook is like a Starbucks where everyone hangs out for hours but almost never buys anything.

The revenue gap between sites like Facebook and Google should narrow over time.  Cost-per-click search ads are extremely good at harvesting intent, but bad at generating intent.  The vast majority of money spent on intent-generating advertising — brand advertising — still happens offline. Eventually this money will have to go where people spend time, which is increasingly online, at sites like Facebook. Somehow Coke, Tide, Nike, Budweiser etc. will have to convince the next generation to buy their mostly commodity products. Expect the online Starbucks of the future to have a lot more – and more effective – ads.

If you want to start a company and are working on new ideas, here’s how I’ve always done it and how I recommend you do it.  Be the opposite of secretive.  Create a Google spreadsheet where you list every idea you can think, even really half-baked ones.  Include ideas you hear about (make sure you keep track of who had which idea so you can credit them/include them later).

Then take the spreadsheet and show it to every smart person you can get a meeting with and walk through each idea.  Talk to VCs, entrepreneurs, potential customers, and people working at big companies in relevant industries. You’ll be surprised how much you’ll learn.  The odds that someone will hear an idea and go start a competitor are close to zero.  The odds you’ll learn which ideas are good and bad and how to improve them are very high.

Every conversation will contain some signal and some noise. Separating the two is tricky. Here are some broad rules of thumb I’ve developed for how to filter feedback based to the profession of the person giving it to you.

1) Employees at relevant big companies. These people are great at providing facts (“Google has 100 people working on that problem”) but their judgment about the quality of startup ideas is generally bad. They tend to have goggles on that makes them think every good idea in their industry is already being built within their company.  For example, every security industry person I talked to thought SiteAdvisor was a bad idea.  (If it wasn’t, they think, someone at McAfee or Symantec company would have already built it!)

2) VCs. VCs are good at telling you about similar companies in the past and present and critiquing your idea in an “MBA-like” way:  will it scale? what are the economics? what is the best marketing strategy?  I would listen to them on these topics but pretty much ignore whether they think your idea is good or bad.

3) Potential customers.  If your product is B2B, remember you’ll be selling to that person 2-3 years from now and by then the world and their priorities will likely have radically changed.  If your product is B2C, it’s interesting to hear how regular consumers think about your product but often they really need to use it fully built and in the proper context to really judge it.

4) Entrepreneurs. This is the one group I listen to without a filter.

Even though I have no intention of starting a new company for a long time (if ever), I still keep my idea spreadsheet and update it periodically.  Some of the ideas I wrote down a few years ago are now companies started by other people (some successful, some not).  A few I had the chance to invest in. It’s interesting to compare my notes and ratings of each idea with how those companies have actually performed. I also keep a list of “on the beach” ideas in case I have time in between startups. These are mostly non-profit ideas.  I don’t know if I’ll ever get to those but they are particularly fun to think about.

* Thanks to James Cham for inspiring & contributing ideas to this post!

Suppose there is a pre-profitable company that is raising venture financing. Simple, classical economic models would predict that although there might be multiple VCs interested in investing, at the end of the financing process the valuation will rise to the clearing price where the demand for the company’s stock equals the supply (amount being issued).

Actual venture financings work nothing like this simple model would predict.  In practice, the equilibrium states for venture financings are: 1) significantly oversubscribed at too low a valuation, or 2) significantly undersubscribed at too high a valuation.

Why do venture markets function this way?  Pricing in any market is a function of the information available to investors. In the public stock markets, for example, the primary information inputs are “hard metrics” like company financials, industry dynamics, and general economic conditions. What makes venture pricing special is that there are so few hard metrics to rely on, hence one of the primary valuation inputs is what other investors think about the company.

This investor signaling has a huge effect on venture financing dynamics. If Sequoia wants to invest, so will every other investor.  If Sequoia gave you seed money before but now doesn’t want to follow on, you’re probably dead.

Part of this is the so-called herd mentality for which VC’s often get ridiculed. But a lot of it is very rational. When you invest in early-stage companies you are forced to rely on very little information. Maybe you’ve used the product and spent a dozen hours with management, but that’s often about it. The signals from other investors who have access to information you don’t is an extremely valuable input.

Smart entrepreneurs manage the investor signaling effect by following rules like:

- Don’t take seed money from big VCs – It doesn’t matter if the big VC invests under a different name or merely provides space and mentoring.  If a big VC has any involvement with your company at the seed stage, their posture toward the next round has such strong signaling power that they can kill you and/or control the pricing of the round.

- Don’t try to be clever and get an auction going (and don’t shop your term sheet). If you do, once the price gets to the point where only one investor remains, that investor will look left and right and see no one there and might get cold feet and leave you with no deal at all. Save the auction for when you get acquired or IPO.

- Don’t be perceived as being “on the market” too long.  Once you’ve pitched your first investor, the clock starts ticking. Word gets around quickly that you are out raising money. After a month or two, if you don’t have strong interest, you risk being perceived as damaged goods.

- If you get a great investor to lead a follow-on round, expect your existing investors to want to invest pro-rata or more, even if they previously indicated otherwise.  This often creates complicated situations because the new investor usually has minimum ownership thresholds (15-20%) and combining this with pro-rata for existing investors usually means raising far more money than the company needs.

Lastly, be very careful not to try to stimulate investor interest by overstating the interest of other investors. It’s a very small community and seed investors talk to each other all the time. If you are perceived to be overstating interest, you can lose credibility very quickly.

There is a widespread myth that search engines have taken profits away from news websites. A few months ago, Rupert Murdoch said: “Google has devised a brilliant business model that avoids paying for news gathering yet profits off the search ads sold around that content.”

The reality is that news is a lousy business. Period. Even Google doesn’t make money on it. For example, here are Google’s search results for the phrase “afghanistan war”:

Notice there aren’t any ads on the page. This is because ads for “afghanistan war” generate such low revenues per query that Google doesn’t think it’s worth hurting the user experience with a cluttered page. Google can afford to do this on news queries (along with many other categories of queries) because their real business is selling ads on queries where the user likely has purchasing intent. Big money-making categories include travel, consumer electronics and malpractice lawyers. News queries are loss leaders.

It’s an historical accident that hard news categories like international and investigative reporting were part of profitable businesses. The internet upended this model by 1) providing a new delivery method for classified ads (mainly Craigslist), 2) increasing the supply of newspapers from 1-2 per location to thousands per location, thereby driving the willingness-to-pay for news dramatically down, and 3) unbundling news categories, making cross subsidization increasingly hard.

The internet exposed hard news for what it is: a lousy standalone business. Google arguably contributed to this in many indirect ways, including by helping users find substitute news sources. But the idea that Google takes profits directly from newspapers is simply misinformed.