Chris Dixon

Increasing velocity

Two common discussions in the startup world right now are 1) the increasing speed at which new apps/websites can gain mass adoption (Instagram, Pinterest, OMGPOP’s Draw Something, etc), and 2) the rise in seed stage valuations. These two trends are real and related.  An investor with a broad portfolio of companies might rationally invest at an average valuation of, say, 10m (which is historically considered very high for that stage) if they have a chance for one of the investments to become the next Instagram or Pinterest. A billion dollar hit pays for a lot of misses.

The increasing velocity has implications for the valuations of incumbent tech companies. Users have limited time, and while web and app usage are growing, hit startups are growing much faster and therefore gaining adoption, at least in part, at the expense of incumbents. It’s not clear this risk is priced into the valuations of companies like Facebook (P/E expected to be ~100) and Zynga (P/E ~31). In other words, faster velocity should lead to a narrower distribution of valuations from seed to late stages. We’ve seen the seed stage adjust but not the late stage.

The current posture of big VCs seems to be to wait to see what takes off and then chase the winners. Tons of investors tried to invest in Instagram’s A and B rounds, and I’m sure VC interest in Pinterest is intense.

The problem with this model of Series A and B investing is that, in reality, many of the companies with big hits weren’t overnight successes. Pinterest, OMGPOP, Twitter, and Tumblr were around for years before taking off and all benefited greatly from having patient investors. In the current financing environment, a lot of good companies won’t live to get Series As and Bs and big VCs will pay valuations on hits that are priced to perfection.

Increasing velocity is great for users and for the winning companies and investors. But when good companies aren’t getting follow on rounds because they aren’t yet “hockeysticking”, the long term health of the startup ecosystem suffers.

  • http://about.me/bradleyjoyce bradleyjoyce

    One case that comes specifically to mind is Weebly… at the ycombinator meetup in NYC last year they showed a chart of how it took them 3 years to finally reach that hockey stick. I think you’re right and we’ll see fewer investors willing to be that patient.

    • http://www.cdixon.org chris dixon

      Thanks, good example.

      • Anonymous

        Hi chris, the CEO of a company in my portfolio in NYC forwarded me your blog info and I have found it quite interesting. I have personally started 5 companies over the years, some of which were sold and others wound down and closed for lack of capital so your topic hits home for me. Fortunately I’m now in a position to help fund a number of various startups and throughly enjoy it. I look forward to reading your insights as well as that of others here.

  • http://www.scoutzie.com/?utm_source=disqus&utm_medium=display_name&utm_campaign=disqus_display Kirill Zubovsky

    What do you suggest should be done in order to help companies survive and win in the long run. Investors aren’t going to just change their minds and start investing differently. Likewise, since you’re saying “big VCs” need to win, and Mark Suster and others have suggested that big VCs usually want 20% of the pie, that means hot companies get way more money in their A and Bs than they need in order to continue growing. That, of course, leads to Colors of this world. So, what do you think we ought to do?

    • http://www.cdixon.org chris dixon

      I think entrepreneurs should think hard about financing risk in their seed rounds. Getting big VCs to write big checks ($1M+) can help. Having them buy options (e.g. $100K check) is a bad idea (something I’ve blogged about ad nauseum). But the most important thing is probably to do diligence on the investors and figure out their reputation for supporting their companies through ups and downs.

      • http://www.scoutzie.com/?utm_source=disqus&utm_medium=display_name&utm_campaign=disqus_display Kirill Zubovsky

        Thank you, Chris.
        You’ve got a great blog going, btw. Very helpful.

        • http://www.cdixon.org chris dixon

          Thanks :)

          • LAVINIA

            @fendien:disqus my classmate’s sister-in-law brought in $16950 Ṗast month. she has been making cash on the internet and got a $3821OO home. All she did was get fortunate and put to use the instructions written on this web site.. http://nowtweet.it/2in6

  • fendien

    Hey Chris, great post. This may be a bit off topic, but your point on velocity made me think about company focus as well — could some people have considered these startups building “features” on social networks vs new businesses.  I remember Fred Wilson posting a while back about being careful what you build on Twitter for instance, and yet here Instagram in a simple way could have been considered “Facebook Photos Mobile,” or at least how it should have been.
    Granted Instagram had enhanced features with the filters and sharing, and was becoming its own social network in a way, but it is interesting to see what this acquisition will inspire in others.Curious as to your thoughts on this, because it seems that if you can find a niche that is important to one of the consumer giants out there, they’ll almost be forced to acquire you as a price of alternative R&D for their platform.

    • http://www.cdixon.org chris dixon

      I think the general consensus is that while photos are a “feature” on Facebook, they are arguably the most important feature. Which is why there have been so many photo sharing apps funded.

      Yeah, I do think if you own a niche that’s important to a consumer giant you have a good chance to get an acquisition offer. But of course that’s a lot easier said than done!

  • http://williampeng.com William Peng

    Agree that the overall long term health of the ecosystem will suffer when investors price every startup as if it were the next multi-billion dollar company. Investors at the seed stage in many cases don’t know which company is going to be the next big winner (too few data points at that stage), so they apply a blunt investing heuristic of paying up on every deal just in case the startup is the next big company that will return the entire fund.

    The fear of missing out and ambiguity about which startup is the next big company means that good companies that would be successful with steady trajectories (rather than extreme hockey stick growth curves) will fall prey to high expectations set by unrealistic valuations set by the aforementioned investors. And I think that they’ll find that the same investors who paid up in the seed round correlate highly with impatient investors.

    • http://www.cdixon.org chris dixon

      I generally agree, but I think one line in your comment stands out  ”good companies that would be successful with steady trajectories will fall prey to high expectations set by unrealistic valuations set by the aforementioned investors.”
      I don’t know if we yet know exactly how this will play out. We might see a wave of companies closing, or downrounds, or lots of talent acquisitions. Or maybe a combination of those things.

      • http://williampeng.com William Peng

        Yea, it’s just a prediction. It’s possible that companies will close, do downrounds, talent acquisitions, but it’s also possible we might see a shift in valuations in A and B rounds to compensate for the seed stage valuations.

        As an investor that invests in both seed and Series A, I’ve been seeing more and more companies recently looking to bridge their previous seed round. Maybe Series A is the new Series B?

        And the thing about companies closing and doing downrounds is I feel that many times it happens silently and without fanfare. Part of the reason why most VCs don’t list their anti-portfolio as Bessemer does. So it might be a slow and silent downturn rather than a loud proclamation that we’re now in a tough fundraising environment.

  • fendien

    definitely makes sense regarding photos, especially as the world increasingly turns to mobile.

    i only wish it was easier to do this in the enterprise space. aaron levie has some great guest posts on techcrunch about how things are ripe now for disruptive technologies to take down incumbents, but the pace is still awfully slow compared to the consumer space.  it is exciting to see continued innovation though, along with some fresh incubators (like http://www.acceleprise.vc/) and meetups (like the NY Enterprise Technology Meetup http://www.meetup.com/ny-enterprise-tech [disclosure - i'm the organizer]) which should help support entrepreneurs and foster innovation.

    • http://www.cdixon.org chris dixon

      My guess is you’ll see it more and more in the b2b space. Might be the most interesting area in tech in the next few years.

  • http://www.alearningaday.com Rohan

    Would love to hear your take on Insta-book.. :)

  • Pingback: Wednesday 7atSeven: increasing velocity | Abnormal Returns

  • http://kidmercury.posterous.com/ kidmercury

    these companies need to find revenues and profits. 1 bn for a company with 12 employees and no revenue……35 million users, the majority of whom were on fb anyway and are probably drowning in debt like the rest of the world……

    i assume it was largely a purchase made with stock, so at least fb investors are just passing the bubble on…..but anyway, same as it ever was, only those companies that get to self-sustaining profitabilty will come out alive after the party’s over and the VCs turned daytraders (which is what you are if you flip shares in a week) run out of folks to sell to. clock’s ticking. 

  • http://twitter.com/byosko Ben Yoskovitz

    Chris – how much of what you’re describing here (and in other posts you’ve written) really comes down to the quality of the investors? The best early stage investors have to realize that things take time – overnight successes aren’t really overnight – and they’d do well to continue supporting their startups for longer periods of time, in order to give those startups the time they need to make it. 

    If early stage investors are expecting legitimate hockey sticks (not manufactured, non-sustainable ones) after investing $100-$500k, we are in trouble, and those companies will die off. Not that every company should be given a lifeline, but investors have to have reasonable and meaningful ways of measuring a startup’s progress to decide whether they want to continue supporting it or not. “Instagram-like growth in a few months” isn’t reasonable as an assumption…

    The big push into early stage investing (including accelerators pumping companies out) has attracted lots of investors that probably shouldn’t be there, that don’t have a real thesis for their early stage investing, or a well-thought out strategy for how to follow-on. Quality of the investor – for entrepreneurs – is definitely one of the biggest things to pay attention to. And entrepreneurs can “measure” quality, in part, by how supportive those investors are of their portfolio…

  • http://leftovertakeout.com gbattle

    In a world of increasing velocity of user growth and commensurate valuations, might there be a case to question where the rotational attention is coming from? Though you’ve explained who, from an investment perspective, is losing velocity, who is losing velocity in the attention economy to sustain this meteoric growth stories? Who is hit hardest by a hockeysticking Instagram, Pinterest, Tumblr and OMGPOP? Might it be Facebook, Amazon, Google and Zynga respectively, or the supernumerous fast followers and sleepy incumbents? And, in a world of of accelerated growth, might this volatility turn against any of these high flyers just as quickly if not faster?

    • http://www.cdixon.org chris dixon

      Good question. At least in the case of OMGPOP the attention seemed to come straight from Zynga and other mobile games (according to DAU’s published on tech blogs). My guess is each new hit tends to take from it’s most similar incumbent – Pinterest from Facebook, OMGPOP from Zynga, a new successful ecommerce site from Amazon, etc

  • http://twitter.com/JM_thatswassup Jared Mermey

    I agree with all the points made here but am wondering if there is something else going on as well. It is a two-part point:

    1) Upper bounds of potential for social services (often non-revenue driving, at least initially) are growing. Yes, the “can’t-miss-out-so-overpay” factor is driving increased valuations in early rounds, but perhaps so is the weighted portion of the high end of the outcome distribution.   2) Social platforms exist to increase velocity that did not exist — or, at least not in their current closer-to-perfected state — to aid distribution. Instagram does not grow at such a tremendous rate without Facebook, Twitter, Tumblr, etc. (both due to how they are built into the product and user tendencies). Because these platforms do exist (a) companies can grow faster than they used to and (ii) the probability of success increases (though probably not tremendously).

    Combine these points into seed stage valuation theory and you have one of the many factors influencing increased early stage valuations. The far right hand tail of the distribution of outcomes is growing in value and probability (the former more than the latter).

    Total Aside: Has anyone ever studied the derivative value to a FB or a Twitter from all the platforms built on top of them? Easy to understand with a Zynga, perhaps less so with a Instagram.

    • http://www.cdixon.org chris dixon

      I agree that a FB that might be fairly valued at $100B changes the math for investing in early stage social companies. You can no longer laugh and wonder how FB will make money. But given how face e.g. MySpace fell it also feels like someone could knock FB off the top.

      Yes, totally agree social platforms like Twitter & FB have contributed a lot to this increase in velocity.

      I don’t know of any such studies. But I think that increasingly in tech, fewer jobs are being created directly by tech companies, but at the same time they are creating many new income streams for people on platforms, marketplaces etc.

      • http://twitter.com/JM_thatswassup Jared Mermey

        Re: your first point…

        As an investor, do you trust your (and the entrepreneur’s) ability to time the exit? And does that factor into early valuations? 

        Yes, MySpace fell…but at one point they were worth a whole lot. If timed correctly, that was/would’ve been a nice ROI. If so, I’d still argue you look at peak potential value — not value “at the end of time” — for the upside weight in a valuation. (i.e., just gotta get there…don’t need to stay there..I should say I think this would be bad entrepreneurship.) 

        Some might argue OMGPop did this well since Draw Something’s DAU’s flatlined soon after their sale.

        • http://www.cdixon.org chris dixon

          Timing the exit is pretty tough. For one thing, perhaps if MySpace stayed independent they’d be worth even more. Also you can find a lot of companies between 2005-9 that seem to have sold too soon (hindsight is 20/20 of course). It’s probably as tough to time startup exits as it is to time any kind of investing (e.g. public stock picking).

  • Pingback: » Increasing velocity is bad for incumbents A.Sarva.Co

  • Anonymous

    Do you think any VC firms are investing in expensive seed rounds as a way of generating more better dealflow? There is some value for a less well-known VC being able to say “we were in on hot-startup early”, regardless of how poor the terms were. There could be other benefits to investing in companies that other founders see as early successes with crazy traction.

    • http://www.cdixon.org chris dixon

      Definitely. We call it “buying posters”. But it is mostly to get an inside track on the next round in case the company is successful.

    • http://reecepacheco.com/ reecepacheco

      and it’s not just about being in on the hot company, but about being in a deal with “X” other big name VC… 

      i’ve had new VC’s admit this to me for sure

  • Pingback: Adding Value « David Lee's Blog

  • JamesHRH

    Insightful post and a great public service to founders. Understanding the dynamic of funders is critical.

    I have yet to see an reasonable argument against finding a lead investor with an interest in growing a business….our founding team likes the Pay Window as much as anybody, but the oldest startup adage ever is ‘if you build to flip, you will likely flop…..’

    • http://www.cdixon.org chris dixon

      Well, in fairness not all startups have a choice. But some do, but decide to go for higher valuations and other terms in exchange for top tier leads.

      • JamesHRH

        Well, you always have choices…… ;-)

        It is amazing to see so many people think they win the race in the first round of funding…..

  • Pingback: Daily Run Down 04/11/2012 | Wayne's Workshop

  • http://twitter.com/braditdigg Brad

    Do you think that nowadays you can succeed without funding though? Pinterest didn’t get any funding till they took off. Even that company that made Draw Something had most of their games not taking off and Draw something was a game that could be made by 2-3 good devs without multi-million funding.

    • http://www.cdixon.org chris dixon

      Pinterest and OMGPOP raised money years ago. (in the case of OMGPOP I happen to know since I invested in them 4 years ago or something. I heard similar stories about Pinterest).

  • Pingback: Increasing velocity – Chris Dixon « Tom Denison's Blog

  • http://twitter.com/CliqFlip Cliq Flip

    First time reader of this blog – Some great information, also really liked the article about overnight success. Completely true, is Instagram an overnight success though? Never thought about that one

  • http://twitter.com/iaboyeji Iyinoluwa Aboyeji

    Would you advice just going slow and waiting it out (if you can) till you get to hockey stick before raising substantial sums of money so you can time traction with funding? 

    My only issue with raising a large round earlier on is depending on VC, it might increase the pressure to sell if there is interest because tech is valuable or traction situation slightly improves. I’ld rather sell and keep more of the pie if I fail. No?

  • Irving Fain

    Disappointing that patience seems to be the lost virtue in a world that felt like it was built on patience for so long…

    • http://twitter.com/wayne_lopez Wayne Lopez

       Agree with you Irving.  Now granted we are talking about Internet companies in which it’s more like dog years so time is of the essence. I’m convinced, and maybe I’m an idealist, that companies that have a good business model even without deep pockets and can find creative ways to monetize their product or service will find a way to win.  Fail fast my friends ;-)

  • http://twitter.com/DannyHorowitz Daniel Horowitz

    Is the increasing velocity such that what took 3 years even in the very recent past, may only take 1.5 now? And, is it so bad, if a company fails, and the good people (who you really invested in) start over?
    Someone mentioned Weebly. I like Weebly. I think I used it when they were still in YC or just after. But, if they had failed, would someone not have created a similar product, and would the founders not have started something else and ultimately become successful? 
    I’ve only seen a bunch online, but I concede that these YC companies are so impressive and potentially disruptive that 10M may be a good price. I thought these uncapped notes are just for option value and negative EV in isolation, but now I think otherwise. Investing in the entire batch of YC at 10M cap will probably yield a nice return. Do you think that these networks are becoming so strong, that companies in YC, TS, 500, have a massive advantage over others? How much of an availability bias is there? (In VC as a whole) How do we start more companies? Are you recommending bootstrapping as long as possible? (Which seems almost always good) or perhaps raising money in smaller increments. I need 100k to get to this milestone. I need X to get here. Sell off small pieces as time goes on. Work with Angels who add value. Crowdfund from your customers?I agree that depending on switching costs, network effects are such that just as fast as some companies rise, they can fall. (You are suggesting that the larger the company, the smaller the P/E should be and we aren’t seeing this)  But, what about the valuations of non tech incumbents. These people are in real trouble as well.  I guess I’m less worried because the ecosystem is rapidly evolving, so it’s not clear what’s optimal, and I believe that good companies/people will rise again. 

    Edit: And that Value is created regardless of success or failure.

  • Mili Mittal

    i think you’re dead-on, chris. this argument implies that pre-hockey stick companies that need funding should target angels – but from what i’ve seen, even a lot of angels like to ‘wait and see what’s hot’ too? am i wrong or is this a DC-specific thing? how do you advise founders to find the and target the patient investors?

    • http://www.cdixon.org chris dixon

      If you’ve already raised angel money and don’t have a hockey stick it is really tough to raise money. Wish I could give good advice but really it’s about doing the company right from the beginning.

      • http://www.conversionrater.com/ Pat McCarthy

        By saying “doing the company right from the beginning” are you referring to getting the hockey stick effect right from the beginning, thus somewhat implying that companies should chase the hockey stick?  

        Of course the hockey stick effect is great and everyone wants it, but it seemed like the tone of your post is that investors are missing out on companies that are growing slow and steady as well.

  • http://about.me/jelpern Jordan Elpern-Waxman

    I think what you are saying is that beta is increased. That implies a wider distribution of startup outcomes, which increases startup valuations (viewing all startup investments as options and pricing them by Black-Scholes); it also implies that large tech company valuations should come down (if you believe in the CAPM). The problem is not that investors are making a rational decision to pay more for a startup on the basis of the velocity theory, but merely miscalculating the velocity (beta) based on a misperception of overnight success by Pinterest, OMGPOP et al; it’s much more prosaic than that. As with any hot asset class – dot-coms, MBS/CDOs, tulips – investors and capital are flooding into seed stage startups in volumes beyond what the asset class can handle, even if the velocity theory is true. A shift in the fundamentals of venture –  new highs in acceleration of growth – may have created some increase in startup values – but more of the increase in valuations is because there is more money than there are good companies to invest in. This time is not different.

    • http://www.cdixon.org chris dixon

      My view is there is always 2 forces that affect prices in markets – supply/demand and investors best guess at value. The impact of each forces ebbs and flows. I am sure that supply/demand has some effect here but I also think in some cases prices are rationally higher.

      • http://about.me/jelpern Jordan Elpern-Waxman

        Investors’ best guess at value drives demand. Whether their best guess at value is rational is up for debate.

        • http://www.cdixon.org chris dixon

          Well, there’s “value money” and there’s “allocation money”. I think its a very different mindset and leads to different outcomes. see, e.g. http://cdixon.org/2011/06/16/allocation-investing-and-the-social-premium/

          • http://about.me/jelpern Jordan Elpern-Waxman

            That’s a great analysis of asset allocation. I never thought of it that way. You should read Bull! for a great account of the psychology behind asset allocation in the late 90′s.


            Sent from mobile.

  • http://twitter.com/danman01 danny k

    It seems to me that barriers to enter the startup game are at their lowest and will continue to fall, market share and adoption for apps / web services is rising (mobile penetration, time spent online, etc), and bullish investors are looking to spend their hard earned cash from years of successful exits outweighing the write offs.

    This combination leads to higher perceived velocity of these so called ‘overnight successes’.  Yes, ‘draw something’ hadn’t been around for more than a 7 weeks before crossing 50m downloads, but the company had been around for years and had taken funding long ago.

    I think investors and other companies are getting better at spotting winners, and thus jump on the opportunity quicker.

    From the outside, people are saying the tech industry could be in another bubble.  It makes for good headlines, but I don’t think that’s the case.

  • Pingback: Forget the data: VCs brace for the Instagram aftereffect — Tech News and Analysis

  • Pingback: GIASTAR – Storie di ordinaria tecnologia » Blog Archive » Forget the data: VCs brace for the Instagram aftereffect

  • Pingback: Forget the data: VCs brace for the Instagram aftereffect | TechDiem.com

  • Pingback: Forget the data: VCs brace for the Instagram aftereffect | Instagram

  • Pingback: The VC industry is broken. So now what? — Tech News and Analysis

  • Pingback: The VC industry is broken. So now what? | freeinkcartridges.info

  • Pingback: The VC Industry Is Broken. Now What? | Pham Capital

  • Pingback: The VC industry is broken. So now what? « Blog of Intellectual Capital

  • Pingback: VCs brace for the Instagram aftereffect : TechHay

  • Pingback: The Aftermath of Instagram Acquisition : IT Needle

  • Pingback: Startups: Why is every person talking about 'startups'. Is it just trendy/hip to do so? - Quora