Chris Dixon

Agency problems

Agency problems” are what economists call situations where a person’s interests diverge from his or her firm’s interests.

Large companies are in a constant state of agency crisis. A primary role of senior management is to counter agency problems through organizational structures and incentive systems. For example, most big companies divide themselves into de facto smaller companies by creating business units with their own P&L or similar metric upon which they are judged. (Apple is a striking counterexample: I once pitched Apple on a technology that could increase the number of iTunes downloads. I was told “nobody optimizes that. The only number we optimize here is P&L in the CFO’s office”).

If you are selling technology to large companies, you need to understand the incentives of the decision makers. As you go higher in the organization, the incentives are more aligned with the firm’s incentives. But knowledge and authority over operations often reside at lower levels. Deciding what level to target involves nuanced trade offs. Good sales people understand how to navigate these trade offs and shepherd a sale. The complexity and counter-intuitiveness of this task is why it’s so difficult for inexperienced entrepreneurs to sell to large companies.

Agency problems also exist in startups, although they tend to be far less dramatic than at big companies. Simply having fewer people means everyone is, as they say in programming, “closer to the metal”. The emphasis on equity compensation also helps. But there are still issues. Some CEOs are more interested in saying they are CEOs at parties than in the day-to-day grind of building a successful company. Some designers are focused on building their portfolio. Some developers are only interested in intellectually stimulating projects. Every job has its own siren song.

One of the reasons The Wire is such a great TV show is that it shows in realistic and persuasive detail how agency problems in large organizations consistently thwart well intentioned individual efforts. The depressing conclusion is that our major civic institutions are doomed to fail. Those of us who are technology optimists counter that the internet allows new networks to be created that eliminate the need for large organizations and their accompanying agency problems. Ideally, those networks recreate the power of large organizations but operate in concert like startups.

  • http://MeetInnovators.com Adrian Bye

    to get your f500 sale you build a trusting relationship with the decision maker, then work with the front level people on specifics.

  • Anonymous

    In addition to incentives, one of the primary factors underlying principal-agent divergence are information asymmetries.

    Mitigating those information asymmetries is something the internet is very good at. e.g.. widely available price information drives prices toward marginal cost and makes it less likely we are ripped off; kickstarter, etsy, sidetour, github, behance, kaggle and other talent elevation platforms can make it easier to find authentic talent instead of relying on mediating people or shortcuts such as resumes or various brand names; opinion creation by bloggers instead of just talking heads, etc..

    By mitigating them, networks instead of institutions largely get “more efficient” results, e.g., lower prices, recognition of better talent, a more accurate reflection of views in society, etc.

    • http://www.cdixon.org/ chris dixon

      Great point.

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  • Anthony Serina

    Large companies try to provide performance incentives to the work force but it is extremely difficult to accomplish because the productivity of the majority of jobs in large organizations is not easily quantifiable. As a result employee performance becomes subjective. The minute performance is subjective politics come into play and employees see right through it. The larger the organization the bigger the bureaucracy and the less productive the average employee becomes. The unfortunate part about it is there are so many great hard working people at large organizations that get completely overlooked because as they say in the wire “its all in the game.”

    • http://www.cdixon.org/ chris dixon

      Exactly. Lots of “management science” is about trying to create objective metrics (e.g. 360 feedback) but IMO it’s probably an impossible problem.

  • http://giangbiscan.com/ Giang Biscan

    A great post, Chris. You have touched there on the importance of understanding and navigating the problem. Would you consider writing more about how to assess and navigate it? Thank you.

    • http://www.cdixon.org/ chris dixon

      Sure, I’ll try :)

  • http://twitter.com/mktgwithmeaning Bob Gilbreath

    Principal-agent problems can also be “exponential” as companies increasingly outsource their operations. Within a company, you might have, say, 90% alignment among interests thanks to company loyalty, profit sharing, annual reviews, etc.

    But when work is outsourced, a supplier is lacking these ties and is much less aligned–say 80%, if you’re lucky. Increasingly, these suppliers also contract with other outside suppliers. So the true alignment can be 80%x80%, or 64%. This is a form of intangible inefficiency that can quietly destroy a company over time.

    • http://www.cdixon.org/ chris dixon

      Interesting- hadn’t thought of that. In that model outsourcing is penny wise, pound foolish.

      • Anonymous

        Hmm, I think there’s a confusion here. The principal-agent problem only applies when the principal has to *delegate decision making authority* – see wikipedia ” the principal–agent problem or agency dilemma concerns the difficulties in motivating one party (the “agent”), to act on behalf of another (the “principal”)”

        In the case of outsourcing, it’s a contractual relationship between companies, so it’s based on requirements, expected vs measured output , Service Level Agreements, etc

        If some people in this thread have experienced inefficiencies in outsourcing, it’s a matter of inefficiency in supplier management, not an agency problem.

        Having said that, the agency problem often happens with the employee in charge of managing the outsourcing contract. On his resume, it will look better to have managed a $20M project to deploy Oracle Financials than spend $200K migrating to NetSuite (plus he gets all these invitations and other goodies from Oracles’ sales reps).

    • http://twitter.com/JC_Mellinger Jonathan Mellinger

      Anecdotally, I watched this first-hand with global insurer/reinsurers offshoring numerous cost-center functions.

    • http://twitter.com/andyidsinga andyidsinga

      also have to be careful to outsource with the right company who will stay aligned when business projections change.

      For instance, when outsourcing to a firm that expects (or even requires) large volumes – I can imagine alignment swinging quite dramatically if those volumes don’t materialize.

    • Anonymous

      Unless you ensure that the supplier is aligned (at least as well as internal teams) through the various parameters available at your disposal. Companies that are great at outsourcing know this well and do the calculus to assess the agency costs (of insourcing vs outsourcing). In some cases, for other biz reasons (speed, agility, risk diversification, P&L leverage/scaling), outsourcing becomes an imperative. I’ve seen large firms do this well where they arrive at an optimal ratio of insourcing vs outsourcing for specific areas within the enterprise. For eg. IBM outsources quite a bit and Amazon does not but both are quite successful.

  • http://twitter.com/CommSEO CommunitySEO

    Food for thought, the counter-balance to agency issues, which are real and serious (federal government, lolz) is culture. The right culture can help empower lower level employees so that while acting in their own rational self-interest, they are also acting in the interest of the firm.

    • http://www.cdixon.org/ chris dixon

      Great point. One of the reasons all the talk about culture isn’t just fluff.

    • http://www.engag.io/Abdallah Abdallah Al-Hakim

      When you hear employees refer to the company as ‘our’ and using terms such as ‘we’ then it usually means that the right culture has been cultivated. I agree with @cdixon:disqus point that culture talk is not ‘fluff’!!

  • http://twitter.com/GoAziz AbdulAziz

    Would love to see this agency costs in government-settings, especially in developing economies!

    • http://www.cdixon.org/ chris dixon

      Probably very high.

  • http://www.facebook.com/mohammadraza.seo MohammadRaza Seo

    wow Great Post
    Chris, i like blog comments and interesting topics Thanks For Sharing me

  • http://www.facebook.com/mohammadraza.seo MohammadRaza Seo

    The case of what economists call “agency problem” the interests of the people, the differences from the interests of his or her company.

  • http://www.salesblend.com/ David Chevalier

    In the U.S., we live in a highly individualistic society but firms want loyalty and interdependence from their people. So it makes sense for firms to attempt to create a culture that serves to align interests and reduce agency problems. (Who hasn’t heard a middle manager exclaim “there is no I in team!”?) But, as you point out, large organizations rarely, if ever, solve their agency problems – there are too many complex, changing forces – and many are uncontrollable. I like your suggestion that the internet connects people in new and powerful ways and that the agency problems and resulting inefficiency in large organizations may be cause for their elimination. In your optimism, how do you see this playing out in the next few years as networks and the internet continue to develop?

  • http://florianfeder.org Florian Feder

    The reason why large organizations have prevailed so far, notwithstanding the agency problem, is transaction costs. It is too time consuming and costly to agree on contract terms to make “operating in concert” a reality for small businesses. My research on automating contract negotiations has tried to tackle this issue. Start-ups like Docracy are also working in this space. Let me know if you want to collaborate.

    • http://www.cdixon.org/ chris dixon

      Agree re transaction costs (a la Coase). Standardized legal documents would definitely help, but there are other “transaction costs” too like discovery, vetting, managing outside relationships, etc.

  • http://markbivens.com/ mark bivens

    Nice post. Coincidentally I’ve recently been thinking about this topic too, though from the angle of raising performance of startup employees (a real issue here in France). Fwiw, here’s my view: http://rude.vc/wrrl

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  • http://www.gordonbowman.com/ Gordon Bowman

    So what are some examples startups can do to have less agency problems?

    • http://www.cdixon.org/ chris dixon

      1) culture / morale and 2) incentives (esp equity)

  • http://earnedmedia.wordpress.com/ Christian Brucculeri

    I just finished Future Perfect by Steven Johnson – great read on this topic (the network piece, at least).

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