Chris Dixon

Seems very relevant to today’s music industry, and potentially relevant to the internet/software industry in the near future as patent lawsuits become increasingly common:

The commons leads to overuse and destruction; the anticommons leads to underuse and waste. In the cultural sphere, ever tighter restrictions on copyright and fair use limit artists’ abilities to sample and build on older works of art. In biotechnology, the explosion of patenting over the past twenty-five years—particularly efforts to patent things like gene fragments—may be retarding drug development, by making it hard to create a new drug without licensing myriad previous patents. Even divided land ownership can have unforeseen consequences. Wind power, for instance, could reliably supply up to twenty per cent of America’s energy needs—but only if new transmission lines were built, allowing the efficient movement of power from the places where it’s generated to the places where it’s consumed. Don’t count on that happening anytime soon. Most of the land that the grid would pass through is owned by individuals, and nobody wants power lines running through his back yard.

From The Permission Problem, James Surowiecki, The New Yorker Magazine.  A very worthwhile read.

The rational way to invest in something – a startup, public company, venture capital firm, real estate project, etc. – is to base your decision on an assessment of its fundamental value. The most common way to do this is to try to predict the asset’s future profits. In reality, many of the largest pools of capital in the world – pensions, endowments, and mutual funds – think in terms of “allocations.” This means they start with a model for how to distribute their funds across a set of dimensions, including asset classes, industries, and geographies. This allocation mentality is based partly on prevalent academic theories (the “Capital Asset Pricing Model” or “CAPM”) and partly on the success of certain famous money managers (the “Yale Model“).

Allocation investing has a number of perverse effects on financial markets. For example, in the 80s and 90s venture capital was deemed to be a successful, independent asset class. As a result, many funds decided to allocate some portion of their capital to VC. These pools of capital were so large that they caused the VC industry to grow orders of magnitude larger – many say larger than it should be. In turn, this led to many bad venture investments that drove down returns in the industry (these problems were further exacerbated by the fee structure of VC that encouraged funds to get large and rapidly “put money to work”).

Another perverse effect caused by allocation investing happens in public stock markets when investors decide to allocate a portion of their funds to specific sectors. I recently heard some money managers saying they wanted to allocate portions of their funds to “social media”. Combining this “allocated” demand with a constrained supply (due to the small float of many of these IPOs) can lead to prices that are disconnected from fundamental values. In this scenario, supply will try to match demand, which means mediocre social media companies will go public and non-social media companies will reposition themselves as social media companies or acquire social media companies. They will be chasing the “social premium.”

We saw this happen in the 90s with the rush of companies to reposition themselves as internet companies. In that case, many non-professional investors ended up owning shares in crappy companies when the music stopped. The primary difference now is that the flagship companies like LinkedIn and Facebook have excellent fundamentals. Hopefully this time the market will be discerning and value investing will win out over allocation investing.

A platform is a technology or product upon which many other technologies or products are built. Some platforms are controlled by a single corporation: e.g. Windows, iOS, and Facebook. Some are controlled by standards committees or groups of companies: e.g. the web (html/http), RSS, and email (smtp).

Platforms succeed when they are 1) financially sustainable, and 2) have a sufficient number of developers that are financially sustainable. Fostering a successful developer community means convincing developers (and, possibly, investors in developers) that the platform is a worthwhile investment of time and money.

Developers who create applications for platforms take on all the usual risks related to launching a new product, but in addition take on platform-specific risks, namely:

1. Platform decline: the platform will decline or go away entirely.
2. Subsumption risk: the platform will subsume the functionality of the developer’s application.

The most successful platforms try to mitigate these risks for developers (not just the appearance of these risks). One way to mitigate platform decline risk is to launch the platform after the platform’s core product is already successful, as Facebook did with its app platform and Apple did with its iOS platform. Platforms that are not yet launched or established can use other methods to reassure developers; for example, when Microsoft launched the first Xbox they very publicly announced they would invest $1B in the platform.

To mitigate subsumption risk, the platform should give developers predictability around the platform’s feature roadmap. Platforms can do this explicitly by divulging their product roadmap but more often do it implicitly by demonstrating predictable patterns of feature development. Developers and investors are willing to invest in the iOS platform because – although Apple will take 30% of the revenue – it is highly unlikely that Apple will, say, create games to compete with Angry Birds or news to compete with The New York Times. Similarly, Facebook has thus far stuck to “utility” features and not competed with game makers, dating apps, etc.

Platforms that are controlled by for-profit businesses that don’t yet have established business models have special challenges. These companies are usually in highly experimental modes and therefore probably themselves don’t know their future core features. The best they can do to mitigate developers’ risks are 1) provide as much guidance as possible on future features, and 2) when developer subsumption is necessary, do so in a way that keeps the developer ecosystem financially healthy – for example, by acquiring the subsumed products.

The least risky platforms to develop on are successful open platforms like the web, email, and Linux. These platforms tend to change slowly and have very public development roadmaps. In the rare case where a technology is subsumed by an open platform, it is usually apparent far in advance. For example, Adobe Flash might be subsumed by the canvas element in HTML5, but Adobe had years to see HTML5 approaching and adjust its strategy accordingly. The predictability of open platforms is the main reason that vast amounts of wealth have been created on top of them and investment around them continues unabated.

Google recently added a caustic warning message when users attempt to export their Google Contacts to Facebook:

Hold on a second. Are you super sure you want to import your contact information for your friends into a service that won’t let you get it out?

Facebook allows users to download their personal information (photos, profile info, etc) but has been fiercely protective of the social graph (you can’t download friends, etc). The downloaded data arrives in a .zip file – hardly a serious attempt to interoperate using modern APIs (update: Facebook employee corrects me/clarifies in comments here). In contrast, Google has taken an aggressively open posture with respect to the social graph, calling Facebook’s policy “data protectionism.”

The economic logic behind these positions is a straightforward application of Metcalf’s law, which states that the value of a network is the square of the number of nodes in the network*.  A corollary to Metcalf’s law is that when two networks connect or interoperate the smaller network benefits more than the larger network does. If network A has 10 users then according to Metcalf’s law its “value” is 100 (10*10).   If network B has 20 users than it’s value is 400 (20*20). If they interoperate, network A gains 400 in value but network B only gains 100 in value. Interoperating is generally good for end users, but assuming the two networks are directly competitive – one’s gain is the other’s loss – the larger network loses.

A similar network interoperability battle happened last decade among Instant Messaging networks. AIM was the dominant network for many years and refused to interoperate with other networks. Google Chat adopted open standards (Jabber) and MSN and Yahoo were much more open to interoperating. Eventually this battle ended in a whimper — AIM never generated much revenue, and capitulated to aggregators and openness.  (Capitulating was probably a big mistake – they had the opportunity to be as financially successful as Skype or Tencent).

Google might very well genuinely believe in openness. But it is also strategically wise for them to be open in layers that are not strategic (mobile OS, social graph, Google docs) while remaining closed in layers that are strategic (search ranking algorithm, virtually all of their advertising services).

When Google releases their long-awaited new social network, Google Me, expect an emphasis on openness. This could create a rich ecosystem around their social platform that could put pressure on Facebook to interoperate. True interoperability would be great for startups, innovation, and – most importantly – end users.

* Metcalf’s law assumes that every node is connected to every node and each connection is equally valuable. Real world networks are normally not like this. In particular, social networks are much more clustered and therefore have somewhere between linear and exponential utility growth with each additional user.

Many singles bars have “ladies’ night” where women are offered price discounts. Singles bars do this for women but not for men because (heterosexually-focused) bars are what economists call two-sided markets – platforms that have two distinct user groups and that get more valuable to each group the more the other group joins the platform - and women are apparently harder to attract to singles bars than men.

Businesses that target two-sided markets are extremely hard to build but also extremely hard to compete against once they reach scale. Tech businesses that have created successful two-sided markets include Ebay (sellers and buyers), Google (advertisers and publishers), Paypal (buyers and merchants), and Microsoft (Windows users and developers). In some cases individuals/institutions are consistently on one side (buyers and merchants) while in other cases they fluctuate between sides (Ebay sellers are also often buyers).

In almost every two-sided market, one side is harder to acquire than the other. The most common way to attract the hard side is the ladies’ night strategy: reduce prices for the hard side, even to zero (e.g. Adobe Flash & PDF for end-users), or below zero (e.g. party promotors paying celebrities to attend). Rarer ways to attract the hard side is 1) getting them to invest the platform itself (e.g. Visa & Mastercard), and 2) interoperating with existing hard sides (e.g. Playstation 3 running Playstation 2 games).

If you are starting a company that targets a two-sided market you need to figure out which side is the hard side and then focus your efforts on marketing to that side. Generally, the more asymmetric your market the better, as it allows you to market to each side more in serial than in parallel.

Steven Schwarzman is the CEO of the Blackstone Group, a multi-billion dollar money management firm. He is worth billions of dollars, and isn’t afraid to spend his money lavishly:

He often spends $3,000 for a weekend of food for Mr. Schwarzman and his wife, including stone crabs that cost $400, or $40 per claw.

Mr Schwarzman pays a lower tax rate than police officers, firefighters, soldiers, doctors, and teachers. This is the due to the fact that money managers’ “carry fees” are treated as capital gains instead of ordinary income.

Last week the House passed a bill that would partly close this loophole. Sadly, with few exceptions, VC’s are lobbying against this bill, arguing it would hurt innovation, small businesses, and lots of other good stuff.  As one prominent VC recently said:

[H]aving those higher taxes be levied against venture capital investments in small businesses strikes me as self-defeating when it is the single largest job growth area.

The argument seems to be that this tax will hurt small businesses. The phrase “small business” is chosen deliberately by VC lobbyists: most people, when they hear it, think of hard working immigrants pursuing the American Dream. In reality, the only thing this bill will hurt are money managers. As Fred Wilson says:

Changing the taxation of the managers will not reduce the amount of capital going to productive areas. The sources of the capital; wealthy families, endowments, pension funds, and the like, will still put the capital in the places where they will get the highest after tax return. And these sources of capital, if they are tax payers, will still get capital gains treatment on their investments in hedge funds, buyouts, and venture capital. And the fund managers will still have to compete with each other to get access to that capital and their incentives will still be to produce the highest returns they can produce, regardless of whether they are paying capital gains or ordinary income on their fees.

As Fred also argues, removing this tax break will encourage more people to go into jobs that produce tangible goods:

We have witnessed financial services (think asset management, hedge funds, buyout funds, private equity, and venture capital) grow as a percentage of GNP for the past thirty years. The best and brightest don’t go into engineering, science, manufacturing, general management, or entrepreneurship, they go to wall street where they will get paid more. And on top of that, we have been giving these jobs a tax break. That seems like bad policy. If we force hedge funds and the like to compete for talent on a more level playing field, then maybe we’ll see our best and brightest minds go to more productive activities than moving money around and taking a cut of the action.

Fred is absolutely correct. For me, though, removing this loophole just comes down to basic fairness. A fireman who runs into burning buildings shouldn’t pay a higher tax rate than a financier sunbathing on a yacht eating $400 crabs.

When having the “open vs closed” debate regarding a technology platform, a number of distinctions need to be made. First, what exactly is meant by “open.” Here’s a great chart from a paper by Harvard professor Tom Eisenmann (et al).:

(Eisenmann acknlowledges the iPhone isn’t fully open to the end user – in the US you need to use AT&T, etc.  I would argue the iPhone is semi-open to the app developer and mobile app development was effectively closed prior to the iPhone. But the main point here is that platforms can be open & closed in many different ways, at different levels, etc.)

The next important distinction is whose interest you are considering when asking what and when to open or close things.  I think there are at least 3 interesting perspectives:

The company: Lots of people have written about this topic (Clay Christensen, Joel Spolsky, more Eisenmann here).   In a nutshell, there are times when a company, acting solely in its self-interest, should close things and other times they should open things.  As a rule of thumb, a company should close their core assets and open/commoditize complementary assets. Google’s search engine is their core asset and therefore Google should want to keep it closed, whereas the operating system is a complement that they should commoditize (my full analysis of what Google should want to own vs commoditize is here). Facebook’s social graph is their core asset so it’s optimal to close it and not interoperate with other graphs, whereas marking up web pages to be more social-network friendly (open graph protocol) is complementary hence optimal for FB to open.  (With respect to social graphs interoperating (e.g. Open Social), it’s generally in the interest of smaller graphs to interoperate and larger ones not to – the same is true of IM networks).  Note that I think there is absolutely nothing wrong with Google and Facebook or any other company keeping closed or trying to open things according to their own best interests.

The industry: When I say “what is good for the industry” I mean what ultimately creates the most aggregate industry-wide shareholder value.  I assume (hope?) this also yields the maximum innovation.  As an active tech entrepreneur and investor I think my personal interests and the tech industry’s interests are mostly aligned (hence you could argue I’m talking my book).  Unfortunately it’s much easier to study open vs. closed strategies at the level of the firm than at the level of an industry, because there are far more “split test” cases to study.  What would the world be like if email (SMTP) were controlled by a single company?  I would tend to think a far less innovative and wealthy one. There are a number of multibillion dollar industries built on email: email clients, webmail systems, email marketing, anti-spam, etc.  The downside of openness is that it’s very hard to upgrade SMTP since you need to get so many parties to agree and coordinate.  So, for example, it has taken forever to add basic anti-spam authentication features to SMTP.  Twitter on the other hand can unilaterally add useful new things like their recent annotations feature.

Here’s what Professor Eisenmann said when I asked him to summarize the state of economic thinking on the topic:

With respect to your question about the impact of open vs closed on the economy, the hard-core economists cited in my book chapter have a lot to say, but it all boils down to “it depends.” Closed platform provides more incentive for innovation because platform owner can collect and redistribute more rent and can ensure that there’s a manageable level of competition in any given application category. Open platform harnesses strong network effects, attracting more application developers, and  thus stimulates lots of competition. There’s some interesting recent work that suggests that markets may evolve in directions that favor the presence of one strong closed player plus one strong open player (consider: Windows + Linux; iPhone + Android). In this scenario, society/economy gets best of both approaches.

Society:  I tend to think what is good for the tech industry is generally good for society.  But others certainly have different views.  Advocates of openness are often accused of being socialist hippies.  Maybe some are.  I am not.  I care about the tech industry.  I think it’s reasonable to question whether moves by large industry players are good or bad for the industry.  Unfortunately most of the debate I’ve seen so far seems driven by ideology and name calling.

From far away, things that are very different look alike. I grew up in a family of musicians and English professors. To them, the entire financial industry seemed corrupt. When I worked in finance – first on Wall Street and then in venture capital – I saw that the reality was much more nuanced. Some finance is productive and useful and some is corrupt and parasitic.

Most financial markets start out with a productive purpose. Derivatives like futures and options started out as a way for companies to reduce risk in non-core areas, for example for airlines to hedge their exposure to oil prices and transnationals to hedge their exposure to currency fluctuations. The sellers of these derivatives were aggregators who pooled risk, much like insurance companies do. The overall effect was a net reduction in risk to our economy without hampering growth and returns.

Then speculators entered the market, creating more complicated derivative products and betting with borrowed money.  This was defended as a way to increase liquidity and efficiency. But it came at the cost of making the system more complicated and susceptible to abuse. Worst of all, these so-called innovations increased the overall risk to the system, something we saw quite vividly during the recent financial crisis.

Venture capital is a shining example of capitalism just like Adam Smith pictured it, where private vice really does lead to public virtue.  Consider, for example, two of the largest areas of venture investment: biotech and cleantech.  Here we see the best and brightest – top science graduates from places like MIT and Stanford – devoting their lives to curing cancer and developing new energy sources.  These students may be motivated by good will, but need not be, since they will also get rich if they succeed.

A strong case can be made that the financial industry needs significantly more regulation, particularly around big banks and derivatives markets. But it would be a tragic mistake to create regulations that hinder angel investing and venture capital.  From the outside, VC and Wall Street might appear similar, but the closer you get, the more you understand how different they really are.

There is a widespread myth that search engines have taken profits away from news websites. A few months ago, Rupert Murdoch said: “Google has devised a brilliant business model that avoids paying for news gathering yet profits off the search ads sold around that content.”

The reality is that news is a lousy business. Period. Even Google doesn’t make money on it. For example, here are Google’s search results for the phrase “afghanistan war”:

Notice there aren’t any ads on the page. This is because ads for “afghanistan war” generate such low revenues per query that Google doesn’t think it’s worth hurting the user experience with a cluttered page. Google can afford to do this on news queries (along with many other categories of queries) because their real business is selling ads on queries where the user likely has purchasing intent. Big money-making categories include travel, consumer electronics and malpractice lawyers. News queries are loss leaders.

It’s an historical accident that hard news categories like international and investigative reporting were part of profitable businesses. The internet upended this model by 1) providing a new delivery method for classified ads (mainly Craigslist), 2) increasing the supply of newspapers from 1-2 per location to thousands per location, thereby driving the willingness-to-pay for news dramatically down, and 3) unbundling news categories, making cross subsidization increasingly hard.

The internet exposed hard news for what it is: a lousy standalone business. Google arguably contributed to this in many indirect ways, including by helping users find substitute news sources. But the idea that Google takes profits directly from newspapers is simply misinformed.

It is almost religious orthodoxy in the tech community that “open” is better than “closed.” For example, there have widespread complaints about Apple’s “closed” iPhone app approval process. People also argue Apple is making the same strategic mistake all over again versus Android that it made versus Windows*. The belief is that Android will eventually beat the iPhone OS with an “open” strategy (hardware-agnostic, no app approval process) just as Windows beat Apple’s OS in the 90′s.

With respect to requiring apps to be approved, consider the current state of the iPhone platform. There are over 100,000 apps and thus far not a single virus, worm, spyware app etc. (I don’t count utterly farfetched theoretical scenarios). As a would-be iPhone developer, I can report firsthand that the Apple approval process is a nightmare and should be overhauled. But what’s the alternative? Before the iPhone, getting your app on a phone meant doing complicated and expensive business development deals with wireless carriers. At the other end of the spectrum: If the iPhone OS were completely open, would we really have better apps?  What apps are we missing today besides viruses?

With respect to the strategic issue of tightly integrating the iPhone/iPad software and hardware, a strong case can be made that Apple’s “closed” strategy is smart. Clay Christensen has given us the only serious theory I know of to predict when it’s optimal for a company to adopt an open versus closed strategy for (among other things) operating systems. The basic idea is that every new tech product starts out undershooting customer needs and then – because technology gets better faster than customers needs go up - eventually “overshoots” them. (PC’s have overshot today – most people don’t care if the processors get faster or Windows adds new features). Once a product overshoots, the basis of competition shifts from things like features and performance to things like price.

The key difference today between desktop computers and mobile devices is that mobile devices still have a long way to go before customers don’t want more speed, more features, better battery life, smaller size, etc. Just look at all the complaints yesterday about the iPad - that it lacks multitasking, a camera, is too heavy, has poor battery life, etc. This despite the fact that Apple is now even building their own semiconductors (!) to squeeze every last bit of performance out of the iPad. Until mobile devices compete mainly on price (probably a decade from now), tight vertical integration will produce the best device and is likely the best strategy.

*It’s worth noting that Steve Jobs wasn’t the one who screwed up Apple. Jobs co-founded Apple in 1976. He was pushed out in in May 1985 when the company was valued at about $2.2B. He returned in 1996 when Apple was worth $3B. Today it is worth $187B.